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Huemoeller: Indian Law - State Jurisdiction on Indian Reservation, Moe v. Con
INDIAN LAW-State Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations, Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).

Two members of the Confederated Tribes who had been
operating "smoke shops" on trust land inside the Flathead
Indian reservation in western Montana were arrested by deputy sheriffs of Missoula and Lake Counties and charged with
failure to possess a cigarette retailer's license and selling nonstamped cigarettes. Both offenses were misdemeanors under
the laws of Montana.1 These individuals, the Tribes and the
tribal chairman then filed suit in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the State's cigarette tax and vending license statutes as applied to members
2
of the Tribes.
By a divided opinion, the three judge District Court 3 held
4
that in light of McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax Commission
these taxing and licensing schemes could not be imposed on
reservation Indians. 5 The court did hold, however, that the
State could require the Indian retailer to add the tax on cig6
arettes to the sales price with respect to sales to non-Indians.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes7 upheld the holdings of the
lower court on every issue. The refusal to allow the imposition of the taxing and licensing schemes on Indians was virtually dictated by cases such as McClanahan and Kennerly v.
District Court of Montana.8 However, the approval of the
holding that Montana can require Indian retailers to precollect the cigarette tax is somewhat more controversial, and
thus, it will be the primary topic of this note.
Copyright @ 1978 by the University of Wyoming.

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-5606.31 (Supp. 1977).
In a later action the Tribe and four enrolled members challenged Montana's assessment and collection of personal property taxes, especially taxes on motor vehicles
owned by tribal members living on the reservation. The district court held that
such taxes could not be levied against the Indians. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes v. Mont. Dep't. of Revenue, 392 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Mont. 1975). The Supreme Court upheld that decision as well in this case.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provided that an interlocutory or permanent injunction
restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of a state statute on grounds
of unconstitutionality should not be granted unless the application has been heard
by a three-judge district court. This section has since been repealed. Act of Aug.
12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119.
411 U.S. 164 (1973).
Confederated Salish & Kooten~i Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont.
1974).
Id. at 1311.
425 U.S. 463 (1976).
400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
AND STATE JURISDICTION

In Worcester v. Georgia9 the Supreme Court laid down
the foundation for the concept of exclusive tribal sovereignty
on Indian reservations, subject only to federal control." The
Court held per Chief Justice Marshall that the laws of the
state of Georgia had no effect whatsoever inside the boundaries of the Cherokee Indian reservation." He recognized
that the authority of the tribe was inherent, in that the presence of its sovereignty on the reservation was assumed unless
an affirmative act of the tribe or the federal government by
treaty or statute, had limited it. 12 The case, at the same time,
recognized the plenary power of the federal government over
the Indians, based on such constitutional provisions as the
commerce and treaty clauses.' 3
Nearly fifty years later, the Court began the erosion of
this doctrine of exclusive tribal sovereignty by holding in
United States v. McBratney 4 that the state court, and not the
federal courts, had jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant
who had murdered another non-Indian on the Ute Reservation. The Court's decision was based on the fact that the Colorado enabling legislation did not contain an express disclaimer
of jurisdiction over Indian territory, and thus, the state had
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians throughout the state,
including Indian reservations." In Utah and Northern Ry.
Co. v. Fisher16 and Thomas v. Gay 1 the Supreme Court
moved further away from Worcester by allowing the states
to tax the property of non-Indians which was located on Indian reservations. Finally, the Court in Draper v. United
States 8 held that even where the state of Montana had disclaimed jurisdiction through its Enabling Act,19 it could still
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
10. Barsh. The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the Future of Tribal SelfGovernment, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2 (1977).
11. Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 9, at 561.
12. Canby, Civil Jurisdictionand the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 206,.207.
13. Dolan, State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Mineral Activities on Indian Reservations, 52 N.D.L. REV. 265,268 (1975).
14. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
15. Canby, supra note 12, at 208.
16. 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
17. 169 U.S. 264 (1897).
18. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
19. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676. The Act applied as well to North
Dakota, South Dakota and Washington.
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exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians who had committed
crimes against other non-Indians on the Crow Reservation.
A major reason for the Court's ignoring the Enabling Act
was its belief that the Act had been superseded by other expressions of Congressional policy, in particular, the General
Allotment Act of 1887 ,20 also known as the Dawes Act. 21 The
Dawes Act was designed to allot the reservations to individual
tribal members, first to be held in trust by the United States,
and then, after twenty-five years, to be conveyed in fee to
the Indians. 22 Once the Indians were granted title they became subject to the laws of the state in which they resided.2
This Congressional policy was itself reversed, however, with
the passage in 1934 of the Indian Reorganization Act. 24 The
Act allowed for the organizing of tribal governments,2 5 the
incorporating of tribes for the purpose of conducting business, 26 the end of the allotment policy 2 7 and the extension of
existing trust periods indefinitely. 8 The purpose of the Act
was to preserve Indian government and the Indian land base
29
and in effect severely limited the applicability of Draper.
But Congress' indecision on Indian affairs meant this policy
was to be short-lived as well.
In the 1950's Congress adopted the policy of termination,
which was designed to end the Indians' status as wards of the
federal government and in turn make them subject to the
same laws as other citizens of the United States.3 1 As a means
20.

Act of Feb. 8, 1887, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 358 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§

24.

Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479, 492
(1970)). The Court in Moe also acknowledged that the Indian Reorganization Act
had limited the effect of the General Allotment Act. Montana had argued that
since the latter Act had never been explicitly repealed, Montana still had taxing
jurisdiction on the reservation. The Court noted that the result of the state's argument would be that Indians living on trust land would not be subject to the state's
tax laws, while Indians living on fee-patent land in the reservation would. This argument was rejected because the Court felt such a "pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction" was contrary to the intent of the present federal law. The Court further noted that in Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) it was held that the Dawes Act had
been repudiated by the Indian Reorganization Act. Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, supra note 7, at 478-79.

331-34, 339, 341, 342,348,349,381 (1970).
21. Draper v. United States, supra note 18, at 247.
22. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970).

25. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
26. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1970).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1970).
29. Barsh, supra note 10, at 14.
30. Canby, supra note 12, at 211.
31. See H.R. Con. Res. 108 of August 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B132.
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of carrying out this policy, Public Law 28032 was enacted by
Congress in 1953. It represented a compromise between abandoning the Indians to the states and maintaining them as federally protected wards.3 The Act transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction to five states3 4 and gave all other states the
option of asserting such jurisdiction, regardless of the preference of any Indian reservation for continued autonomy. 5
States without disclaimers in their enabling acts could exercise jurisdiction by legislative action pursuant to Section 7 of
the Act, while those states with disclaimers had to repeal
36
them by constitutional amendments.
The Supreme Court, however, failed to follow in Congress'
footsteps. Instead, just five years later it handed down its
first in a series of decisions that seemed to run counter to the
termination policy. 7 In Williams v. Lee38 the Court held that
Arizona courts had no jurisdiction over a suit brought by a
non-Indian store owner on the Navajo Reservation to recover
amounts due on credit sales to reservation Indians. The Court
stated for the first time the rule by which the extent of state
jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations was to be determined9 when it said: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." 40 Justice Black also
noted that the exclusive sovereignty rule of Worcester had
been modified over the years "in cases where essential tribal
relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians
would not be jeopardized." 41 Nevertheless, the Court felt
that allowing state jurisdiction here would infringe on the
rights of the Indians to govern themselves even though the
respondent was a non-Indian.4 The Court further noted that
32. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended, 18 U.S.C. §
1162 (1970), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970)).
33. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians. 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 535, 537 (1975).
34. The five were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin. Alaska was
added in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545.
35. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 538.
36. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505 §§ 6,7, 67 Stat. 588, 590.
37. Canby, supra note 12,at 212.
38. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
39. Dolan, supra note 13, at 278.
40. Williams v. Lee, supra note 38, at 220.
41. Id. at 219.
42. Id. at 223.
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Congress had provided Arizona with a means of asserting jurisdiction through PL 280, but the State had failed to accept
it.4s
In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan," decided in 1962,
the Court appeared to limit the holding of Williams. Although
only dicta, Justice Frankfurter took*New York ex rel. Martin
v. Ray, 45 Thomas and Williams to say that state laws may be
applied to Indians unless they "would interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right granted by federal
law." ' "6 This statement seemed to substitute a presumption
of state jurisdiction for one of Indian sovereignty on reservations. 47 The possible confusion caused by Kake was eliminat48
ed, however, in a series of later Supreme Court decisions,
the first of which was Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona
Tax Commission.4" The Court in Warren held that the federal
government had pre-empted the area of trading with the Indians such that Arizona could not levy its income tax on the
non-Indian owner of a business being conducted with Indians
on the Navajo Reservation." The Court found that the allinclusive regulations and statutes showed a congressional intent to totally pre-empt this area and that the imposition of
any state laws would frustrate the congressional purpose of
having no burden placed on trading with Indians except those
authorized by acts of Congress.5 1
The next two cases in the series involved attempts by
states to exercise jurisdiction directly over reservation Indians.
Before they were decided, however, Congress made important
changes in PL 280 by enacting Title IV of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968.2 Among other things, the Act involved two
amendments, the first of which was the requirement of consent by the tribe before a state could assume PL 280 jurisdic43.

Id. at 222-23.

44.

369 U.S. 60 (1962).

45.

326 U.S. 496 (1946). The Court held in this case that a New York state court had
jurisdiction to try one non-Indian for the murder of another on an Indian reservation inside the state. It found no statutes or treaties which prohibited the exercise
of such jurisdiction.
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, supra note 44, at 75.
Dolan, supra note 13, at 279.
Id. at 279.
380 U.S. 685 (1965).
MAXFIELD, DIETERICH, & TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN
INDIAN LANDS, 90 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MAXFIELD].
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra note 49, at 690-91.
Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, §§ 401-406, 82 Stat. 73, (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970)).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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tion.53 Such consent could be given only through means of a
majority vote of the adult Indians affected.5 The second
provision allowed the states to give their PL 280 jurisdiction
back to the federal government. 55 In the first of the two
cases referred to above, Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, the Court held that failure of the tribe itself to vote on
giving the state concurrent jurisdiction as required by the Act
meant that the State could have no authority at all over reservation Indians.5 ' The Court seemed to be saying that PL 280
pre-empted all other means by which a state could assert jurisdiction over reservation Indians,57 and thus, failure to follow
the proper procedure in enacting it meant the state lacked
any jurisdiction .8

in the second case, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission, the Court held that the imposing of an income
tax on a reservation Indian's income earned on the reservation "interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and
statutes leave to the exclusive province of the federal government and the Indians themselves." 59 Justice Marshall noted
that there had been a switch from the concept of Indian sovereignty being a bar to state jurisdiction toward a reliance on
federal pre-emption based on applicable treaties and statutes. 6 Following this line of reasoning, the Court looked at
the treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation, 6' the State's
Enabling Act6 1 and the State's failure to enact PL 280 as

proof that Arizona had exceeded its authority in attempting
63
to collect the tax in question.
The Court, however, did recognize that the State had an
interest in asserting its jurisdiction over non-Indians and could
do so, according to Williams, up to the point where tribal
sovereignty was affected.6 4 Thus, with the McClanahan decision the Court seemed to be saying that it still recognized the
power of a state to assert jurisdiction over non-Indians on res53. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322 (1970).
54. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970).
56. Kennerly v. Dist. Court of Montana, supra note 8, at 427.
57. MAXFIELD, supra note 50, at 84.
58. Kennerly v. Dist. Court of Montana, supra note 8, at 427.
59. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra note 4, at 165.
60. Id. at 170.
61. 15 Stat. 667,668.
62. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569.
63. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra note 4, at 172.
64. Id. at 179.
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ervations as long as there was no infringement on tribal selfgovernment, but that this rule had no effect where reservation
Indians were involved.6 Instead, the issue there was federal
pre-emption, or the extent to which the federal government
had authorized such assertions of jurisdiction by the states in
statutes and treaties. 6 Based on Kennerly and McClanahan it
would appear that this means the state would have to follow
the provisions of PL 280 or have no jurisdiction over reservation Indians at all67
THE COURT'S REASONING
As mentioned earlier in the factual background, the Court's
holding in Moe that Montana could not directly tax, or regulate by licensing, Indian retailers amounted to a mere following in the footsteps of McClanahan and Kennerly.6 8 The rationale for the holding in the second part of the case, however, is not so clear, nor is its effect. The Court held in the
second part of Moe that the state could require the Indian
retailer to precollect taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians.
Justice Rehnquist accepted the finding of the District Court
that the cigarette tax was presumed to be a direct tax on the
retail consumer, 9 a finding apparently based solely on the
words of the Montana statute.7 0 Furthermore, the nonpayment of the tax by the consumer was a misdemeanor according to the statutes. Justice Rehnquist appeared troubled by
the fact that an Indian retailer would receive a competitive
advantage over his non-Indian counterpart because a non-Indian consumer was "willing to flout his legal obligation to
pay the tax."' 71 The only way to enforce the law was to re72
quire the retailer to collect the tax.
65. Canby, supra note 1-2, at 215.
66. Dolan, supra note 13,at 284.
67. MAXFIELD, supra note 50, at 84.
68. Before the Court was able to reach the substative issues of the case it had to decide
whether the district court was prohibited from exercising jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1341 (1970) forbade district courts from enjoining the levying or collection of
taxes authorized by state law where a speedy and efficient trial could be had in the
state's courts. The Court held that neither the United States or its instrumentalities
were barred from proceeding in federal court by this statute. It also found that 28
U.S.C. § 1362 (1970) gave the district courts original jurisdiction over actions
brought by Indian tribes that had been recognized by the Secretary of Interior. The
Court then held that while the tribes were not instrumentalities of the federal government, based on § 1362 and based on the fact that the government could have
brought this action for the tribes, they were to be treated as if the United States
had sued on their behalf and thus, the district court had jurisdiction.
69. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Moe, supra
note 5, at 1308.
70. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-5606.1 (Supp. 1977).
71. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra note 7, at 482.
72. Id.
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The Tribe argued that Warren TradingPost v. Arizona Tax
Commission controlled because making the retailer an involuntary agent of the state was an interference with its freedom
from state regulation, 73 but the Court rejected that argument.
Justice Rehnquist said that Warren did not bar the taxing of
the receipt of sales on reservations to non-Indians. 7 4 Further,
he found that the burden being placed on the retailer was
"minimal" and "not, strictly speaking, a tax at all. ' ' 75 Then,
in reference to the Williams test he found nothing in the requirement which infringed on tribal self-government. 76 In ad77
dition, he found no conflicting federal laws.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION

brvtyo
The

ustice, Rehnquist's

opinion on

this

L,

of the case makes analysis somewhat difficult. One effect of
this conciseness is that the Court cites almost no other cases
in support of its holding. Two of the cases cited, Warren and
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,78 were distinguished by the
Court. Warren was distinguished because the tax there was
imposed on a seller directly, whereas here the tax was imposed
on a non-Indian source. 79 The Court also held that the preemption issue which was central to Warren did not apply in
this case. 80 Later the Court dismissed the pre-emption problem again with a brief quote from United States v. McGowan8 1
and a citation to Thomas v.Gay. 82
It would seem the problem is somewhat more involved
than Justice Rehnquist's opinion indicates. For instance, it is
not clear that this issue simply represents a question of Mon73. Id.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 483.

76. Id.
77.
78.

Id.
411 U.S. 145 (1973). Mescalero, a companion case to McClanahan, held that offreservation activities by reservation Indians may be less protected by federal preemption than activities conducted on the reservation. In particular, New Mexico
was trying to collect taxes on a ski resort run by the Mescalero Apache Tribe off
the reservation. The Court held that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 prohibited collection of a use tax on permanent improvements to the resort, but the
Court found that this same Act did not prohibit the state from levying a tax on the
gross receipts of this Indian-run enterprise.
79. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra note 7, at 482.
80. Id.
81. 302 U.S. 535 (1938). In this case the Supreme Court held that the Reno Indian
Colony was Indian country and thus, the regulations of the federal government on
the sale of intoxicants to Indians applied to it. It also held that the state of Nevada
could exercise jurisdiction within the colony as long as it did not conflict with federal enactments.
82. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra note 7, at 483.
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tana's right to tax non-Indians on the reservation as was the
issue in Thomas. While it may be true that this tax is being
imposed on the non-Indian buyer, there is an added element
here in that the State is imposing its taxing powers through
the involuntary offices of a reservation Indian. Furthermore,
it is the Indian himself who is the party before the Court.8
Thus, the question appears to be the same on this issue as it
was on the other issues of the case; in particular, whether the
state can exercise jurisdiction over Indians on reservations.
Justice Rehnquist avoids use of words such as jurisdiction
and instead characterizes the state's requirement as a "burden. '8 4 An examination of the possible immediate ramification of his holding, however, will show that the state has been
given power to do much more than merely impose a burden.
Besides having power to require the precollection of the sales
tax, the state must also have power to impose penalties for
the failure of the Indian retailer to do so. Montana statutes
provide criminal penalties for the sale of cigarettes without
the tax stamp on the package!' This would seem to apply to
the Indian retailer, and thus, the effect of the Court's holding
is to give Montana criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians.
The Court in previous decisions has held that PL 280 is
the sole way by which states can obtain criminal jurisdiction
over Indians residing on reservations 6 Although Justice
Rehnquist did not even mention this statute in his holding,
the district court noted that Montana had enacted PL 280 in
respect to the Flathead reservation so that it had complete
criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over the Indians 7 The
lower court held, however, that even though the taxing statutes were subject to enforcement by criminal penalties they
were nonetheless "civil revenue collecting provisions." ' Since
the limited civil jurisdiction the state had assumed did not include taxation, the court felt these statutes could not be applied directly to the Indians through PL 280. 89 In fact, PL
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 466.
Id. at 483.

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-5606.18,.31 (Supp. 1977).

Kennerly v. Dist. Court of Montana, supra note 8; McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, supra note 4.
87. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, supra note 5, at 1306.
88. Id.
89. Montana had assumed jurisdiction in the following areas: compulsory school atten-
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280 does not ever authorize the taxation of Indians as the Supreme Court has recognized in Bryan v. Itasca County of
Minnesota.90 In that case the Court held that PL 280 did not
empower the states to impose their taxing and regulatory
schemes on the states, but rather that the primary intent of
Congress when it granted civil jurisdiction under PL 280 was
simply to give the state courts authority to hear private litigation involving reservation Indians.91
It is unclear, therefore, by what authority the state will
seek to enforce its statutes against the Indian retailer so that
he will be compelled to precollect the tax on sales to nonIndians. The district court never decided this issue and instead
until after the Supreme Court had handed down
opted to wait
its decision. 92 Utah and Northern Ry. Co. v. Fisher presents a
basis on which the state could build an argument. In this case
the Supreme Court refused to enjoin the tax collector of
Oneida County, Idaho from enforcing a tax deficiency against
the railroad by selling that part of its roadbed which ran
through the Fort Hill Indian Reservation.93 Montana has recently expanded on this by actually enforcing its process on
the reservation against a reservation Indian. In Little Horn
State Bank v. Stops the Montana Supreme Court held that
where the state court had the authority to enter a judgment
against a reservation Indian, it also has the authority to come
on the reservation to enforce the judgment. 4 Similarly, in
the Moe situation the state could argue that the existence of
the duty of the retailer to collect the state's use tax implies
that the state has the right to enforce its penal sanctions for
failure to perform the duty. The holding of the Montana Supreme Court, however, is not universally accepted. The federal district court for South Dakota refused to allow the state
to enforce a judgment against a reservation Indian in Annis v.
Dewey County Bank.9 5
dance; public welfare; domestic relations (except adoptions); mental health, insanity, care of the infirm, aged and afflicted; juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation; adoption proceedings; abandoned, dependent, neglected, orphaned or
abused children; and operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets and highways. Id.

90. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
91. Id. at 383.
92. Brief for appellee at 12, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra
note 7.
93. Utah & Northern Ry. Co. v. Fisher, supra note 16, at 29.
94. 3 Indian L. Rep. h-60 (Mont. 1976).
95. 333 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971). In this case the federal court was able to give the
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Another argument the state might make use of on PL 280
reservations, is that even though Bryan would not allow them
to collect the tax on sales to Indians, nevertheless, under the
criminal jurisdiction the states have assumed, they may be
able to enforce the penal provisions of the statutes against the
Indian retailer so that the taxes they are entitled to from sales
to non-Indians will be collected. One problem with such an
argument is that Moe did not seem to be based in any way on
the special jurisdictional situations of PL 280 reservations.
Rather, the holding seems to apply across the board to all Indian reservations, whether PL 280 is in effect or not. For that
reason, the holding would seem to conflict with the pre-emtion principles of Kennerly because it appears to give the
states powers of enforcement against Indians without federal
statutory authorization.
Justice Rehnquist also applied the Williams v. Lee test
in determining the validity of the imposition of the precollection duty on the Indian retailer. 96 In McClanahan,the Supreme
Court stated that the Williams test is generally used in situations involving non-Indians, 7 and thus, it would appear to be
the proper test here, especially since the Court found that
there was pre-emption of state jurisdiction by federal statutes
or treaties.9 8 However, Justice Rehnquist applied the test in a
cursory fashion by simply stating that there was no infringement on tribal self-government, without giving the least indi99
cation of how he arrived at this decision.
As with the pre-emption issue, the infringement question
was not so clear as Justice Rehnquist's manner of handling it
indicated. The shops in question here were operated on trust
land leased from the tribe.1 00 Therefore, the continuing profitable operation of these businesses was certainly a matter of
concern to the tribe. The profitability of these shops was directly related to the lower price they could charge consumers
defendant the relief he sought in that it authorized the bank to attach the plaintiff's livestock which had been pledged as security for the loan in question. The
court in Little Horn State Bank, however, noted that if the state court couldn't enforce the judgement the bank would not be able to get relief because it was unable
to meet the requirements to invoke federal jurisdiction. Little Horn State Bank v.
Stops, supra note 94 at h-64.
96. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra note 7, at 483.
97. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra note 4, at 179.
98. See id. at 180 n.21.
99. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra note 7, at 483.
100. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, supra note 5, at 1301.
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because the cigarettes were not taxed.10 1 The district court
held that it was the consumer who reaped the benefit of the
tax exemption, but in the next sentence it also acknowledged
the competitive advantage the Indian retailer received because
of the tax exemption. 0 2 It is this competitive advantage which
makes the operation profitable and also keeps a profitable,
operating business on tribal trust lands. Certainly this is a
matter of concern to the tribal government in that the ending
of the competitive advantage constitutes an infringement, indirect perhaps, but nevertheless substantial.
There were several other factors which the Court failed to
examine. One was the fact the Court in earlier cases had recognized that tribes are made up of individuals and thus, direct
infringement on their rights amounts to direct infringement
on the rights of the tribe .103 The infringement of the rights of
the Indian retailer, therefore, could conceivably be a direct
infringement on the right of self-determination of the tribe.
Another factor was the question of who really bore the tax.
The Court accepted, without comment, the presumption of
the Montana statute that it was a user tax. 1 4 Justice Black, in
Warren, noted that the tax in question there would in effect
be imposed both on the consumer and the seller whom the
state claimed to be taxing.0 5 A sales tax such as that being
imposed here could also be considered as falling on both the
consumer and the seller in actual economic practice."0 If this
were true, then the tax would clearly be banned for the same
reasons the other taxes in this case were.
THE EFFECT OF THE HOLDING

As the tribes' quest for economic and political autonomy
takes shape, and as the importance of the natural resources
on tribal lands is recognized, the possibilities of state and
tribal jurisdictional conflicts grow greater. 0 7 This is especially
true considering the likelihood that non-Indians may actually
mine the resources or may just begin to move on the reserva101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 1311.
Id. at 1308.
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra note 4, at 181.
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra note 7, at 481.
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra note 49, at 691.
Barsh, supra note 10,at 30.
Israel, Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism, in INSTITUTE ON INDIAN LAND* DEVELOPMENT, 10-39 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1975).
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tion in increasing numbers. At the same time it is also likely
that the tribes will be involved, to a greater degree, in the
control and ownership of some of the mining and business
ventures than they have been in the past. 08 Therefore, when
the state seeks to assert its authority over non-Indians on the
reservation there will also be an impact on the Indian, thus
raising the same pre-emption and infringement issues as were
involved in Moe.
One possible area of conflict involves mining enterprises
where Indian and non-Indian developers act as co-venturers.
If they operate under a lease given by authority of the 1938
Mineral Leasing Act 1 9 they apparently would not be subject
to state tax.110 However, authority does exist for the state's
taxation of non-Indian lessees of minerals owned by individual
Indians."' It is possible Moe may also allow state taxation of
minerals mined from lands owned by the tribe itself." 2 Taxation of the venture in question here would amount to taxation of an Indian, which McClanahan would not permit."'
But, at the same time the venture reaps an added benefit because of the non-Indian's willingness to avoid his obligation
to pay the tax, similar to the non-Indian purchasing cigarettes
in Moe. Thus, a court might apply a Moe rationale to impose
a tax on the venture, at least equal to the non-Indians share
in it, even though it causes an increase in the value of the raw
material.
There are other areas where taxation policies of the states
could interfere with tribal plans for mineral development. One
such area is where an Indian himself is the sole developer of
the natural resource. Clearly state attempts to impose royalty
taxes on him would be invalid if he was acting under the Act
of 1938. However, based on Moe the state could apparently
place a tax on his product which would be statutorily defined
as a user's tax, thus sidestepping other federal government
and Supreme Court prohibitions.11 ' The effect of this would
108. Ziontz, Indian Self-Determination: New Patterns for Mineral Development, in INSTITUTE ON INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT, 13-5 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1975).

109. Act of May 11, h938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 348 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 396A-G
(1970)).
110. Santa Rosa Oil and Gas v. Bd. of Equalization, 110 Mont. 268, 54 P.2d 117 (1936).
rev'd in part, 112 Mont. 359, 116 P.2d 1012 (1941).
111. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
112. Isreal, supra note 107, at 50 n.73.
113. Id. at 37.
114. Barsh, supra note 10, at 48.
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be to take away a tax shelter which the tribe may have intended to operate to the advantage of the Indian entrepreneur.
Another area of conflict would arise if the tribe itself wished
to levy a tax. By allowing the state to impose its user tax in
the above situation, and in the factual situation in Moe as
well, the effect of the tribe's tax is to price the Indian developer or businessman out of the market. Thus, the state tax
infringes directly on the tribal self-government, yet it is conceivable that Moe would uphold the state's tax. This may
force the tribe to implement its tax as soon as possible in
order to establish infringement when the state later attempts
to impose its tax." 5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has had a chance to
apply the Moe holding in yet another context. In FortMojave
Tribe v. San Bernardino County116 the court held that the
County could levy a possessory interest tax on a non-Indian
lessee of land held in trust by the federal government for reservation Indians. The court believed Moe was analogous because it was possible that the non-Indian was the sole beneficiary of the tax exemption." 7 The court gave no basis for
its finding that the lessee was the sole beneficiary, but it did
go on to say that even if the tribe did receive some benefit,
the closing of the exemption would constitute only a minimal
burden to it." 8 The court also rejected arguments that the
taxation by the County interfered with the tribe's taxing
ability and that tribal revenues would be reduced because it
would no longer be able to market tax exemptions through
lower prices for its leases." 9 The court was unsure, however,
how the state would enforce a tax deficiency against the nonIndian lessee, suggesting that perhaps it could seize the lessee's
personal property or maybe even proceed directly against
him. 120 The court also dismissed the Indians' fears that their
lands would be subject to tax sales, mentioning that federal
statutes were designed to prevent this from happening.' 2 ' In
the end, the court said that they were not required to "trace
115.
116.
117.

Ziontz, supra note 108, at 32.
543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
Id. at 1258.

- U.S. -

, 97 S.Ct. 1678 (1977).

118. Id.
119.

Id.

120. Id. at 1259.
121.

Id.
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out precisely the accommodations which the county and the
lessee must make to protect the Indians in the event the lessee
22
defaults in payment of the tax here being challenged." 1
Another area of possible state-tribal conflict is that of
regulation. Although the Supreme Court has held that states
were given no regulatory power over Indian reservations under PL 280,123 the conflict exists because of state attempts to
impose environmental or zoning regulations on non-Indians
living or operating businesses inside the reservations. Development of sub-divisions by the tribes through the selling of long
term leases to non-Indians is one example of an activity that
could accentuate this conflict. 24 Further jurisdictional disputes could occur when industrial enterprises lease tribal
lands located next to off-reservation property zoned for family residences. Although the states cannot regulate the tribes
directly to prevent the above from occurring, the state may
still be able to regulate the business itself, since Moe preserves
state regulatory power over non-Indians. 12 Once again the
state could claim that the business receives an economic advantage from its willingness to flout zoning requirements or
environmental regulations. By citing Thomas or Utah and
Northern Ry. Co. for the validity of its interest in non-Indians
and Moe for the principle that the state needs this regulatory
power to prevent violations of its laws by people over whom
it has jurisdiction, the zoning and economic development
schemes of the Indians could possibly be sidestepped. The result is considerable state control over economic development
on the reservation itself.
CONCLUSION

From Williams to McClanahan the Supreme Court appeared to be following a pattern of limiting state jurisdiction
and expanding the areas of federal pre-emption and tribal
sovereignty, even though the fifteen years represented by
those opinions have not always followed a straight course, as
evidenced by the Kake holding. Nevertheless, by 1973 the
122.

Id.

123.
124.

Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn.,supra note 90.
For a discussion of this problem see,Gonzales, Indian Sovereignty, and the Tribal
Right to Charter a Municipality for Non-Indians: A New Perspective for Jurisdiction on Indian Land, 7 N.M.L. REV. 153 (1977).
MAXFIELD, supra note 50, at 111.

125.
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Court had made any state jurisdiction over reservation Indians
totally dependent on authority derived through federal statutes. Also, the state's exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indians
was conditioned on a strict requirement of no infringement
on the tribe or its aggregate members. The Court's holding in
Moe has brought this development to an abrupt and somewhat surprising halt.
Without saying so, Moe presents the possibility that the
states may be able to exercise jurisdiction over reservation
Indians, in certain cases, without any authorization at all from
the federal government. Because of the states' authority to
regulate the affairs of non-Indians on the reservation, they
may indirectly be able to impose their zoning, taxing, environmental and other regulations on the reservation even though
there is an effect upon the Indians. The limits of this power
are reached when the regulation conflicts with tribal self-government, but Moe neither establishes where these limits lie
nor does it give any guidance as to how to find the limits.
The tribes will suffer somewhat because the reservations may
lose tax and regulatory shelters which would compensate new
businesses for the other disadvantages of locating on the reservation. It could also affect possible competitive advantages
the tribes would have in developing their natural resources, as
well as cutting into their potential tax revenues. Only time
will tell what the limits of Moe are, but the holding in Fort
Mojave seems to indicate that the decision may represent
more than a small gain for the states.
JAMES L. HUEMOELLER
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